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INDIAN TRUST FUND: RESOLUTION AND
PROPOSED REFORMATION TO THE
MISMANAGEMENT PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE INDIVIDUAL INDIAN MONEY
ACCOUNTS IN LIGHT OF COBELL V. NORTON
ChristopherBarrett Bowman+
"'I [had] never seen more egregious misconduct by the federal
government, now at the conclusion of the second contempt trial, I stand
corrected. The Department of Interior has truly outdone itself this
time."" These rather harsh comments were written by U.S. District

Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth 2 in a recent opinion in connection with
the litigation concerning the mismanagement of the Individual Indian
Money (IM) accounts.' In December 1999, Judge Lamberth ordered
the federal government to initiate a major overhaul of the IIM account
system and to render a historical accounting of these funds. Eighteen
months after the order, the situation "ha[d] barely improved."5
It is estimated that between 300,000 and 500,000 Indians have been
deprived of between ten and forty billion dollars as a result of over one
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Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to express his gratitude to Marcella Giles for her guidance
and assistance during the development of this Comment. The author would also like to
thank his parents-Thomas and Patricia-for their support and encouragement.
1. Helen Rumbelow & Neely Tucker, Interior's Norton Cited for Contempt in Trust
Suit, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2002, at Al. These comments were taken from an opinion
citing Interior Secretary Gale Norton and assistant secretary for Indian Affairs Neal
McCaleb with contempt of court for failing to abide by a three-year-old court order
requiring the reformation of Individual Indian trust funds. Id. In February 1999, Judge
Lamberth found then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and then-Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Rubin in contempt of court for failing to meet court-ordered deadlines in
connection with the production of documents pertaining to trust fund data. John Fialka,
Indians Again Ask Federal Judge to Cite Interior Secretary Babbitt for Contempt, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 17, 2000. As a result of this ruling, the United States was ordered to pay
$625,000 in fines to plaintiffs' lawyers and accountants. Id.
2. U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth has been described as "one of the
toughest judges around when it comes to public officials." John Gibeaut, Another Broken
Trust, 85 A.B.A.J. 40,43 (1999).
3. Rumbelow & Tucker, supra note 1.
4. Cobell v. Norton: An Overview, at http://www.IndianTrust.com/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Overview.Home (last visited Nov. 27, 2002); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
5. Rumbelow & Tucker, supra note 1.
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hundred years of trust fund mismanagement by the federal government.
Since the 1880s, the federal government has held in trust royalties
generated from tribal lands through mineral mining, grazing, timber, and
The government agency charged with managing and
oil drilling.'
accounting for these royalties, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), has
been accused of "mismanaging, diverting and losing money that belongs
to Indians" for over one hundred years." John Echohawk, director of the
Native American Rights Fund, referred to the current situation as "yet
another serious and continuing breach in a long history of dishonorable
treatment of Indian tribes and individual Indians by the United States
government.'9
Evidently a problem exists, as neither side has disputed the gravity of
This Comment examines the current state of the
the situation.'0

6. Cobell v. Norton: An Overview, supra note 4; Rumbelow & Tucker, supra note 1;
Joel Dyer, Billions Missing from U.S. Indian Trust Fund, Albion Monitor/News, at
(last visited Nov. 27, 2002);
http://www.monitor.net/monitor/free/biatrustfund.html
Kathleen Koch, Native Americans: Government Breaking Promises Over Land Use Trust
Fund, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/03/02/indian.trust.fund/ (Mar. 2, 2000).
7. Koch, supra note 6.
8. Dyer, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. For purposes of this Comment, the opposing parties in this dispute will be
considered the same as those currently litigating in Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs in that case represent approximately 300,000 IIM beneficiaries who
are demanding that the federal government render an accurate historical accounting of the
IIM trust. Id. at 1086; Order Certifying Class Action at 1, Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 96-1285). The plaintiffs specifically contend that defendants (the
U.S. Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Treasury) have failed in their capacity as
trustees with respect to the following issues:
(a) They have failed to keep adequate records and to install an adequate
accounting system, including but not limited to their failure to install an adequate
accounts receivable system;
(b) They have destroyed records bearing upon their breaches of trust;
(c) They have failed to account to the trust beneficiaries with respect to their
money;
(d) They have lost, dissipated, or converted to the United States' own use the
money of the trust beneficiaries; and
(e) Defendants ... have prevented, and combined and conspired with others to
prevent, the Special Trustee for American Indians, appointed pursuant to the
American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 ("the 1994 Act"),
P.L. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239, codified to 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4061, from carrying
out duties and responsibilities conferred upon him by law to correct their
unlawful practices and procedures with respect to IIM accounts. Complaint to
Compel Performance of Trust Obligations, June 6,1995, (D.D.C. 1995).
Id. Conversely, defendants hold that they are actively fulfilling their trust responsibilities
as defined in the 1994 Reform Act, and are taking the appropriate steps toward
reconciling the IIM accounts in light of the prior mismanagement. See Comment by Steve
Griles, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, concerning Indian Trust Fund
reform, at http://www.doi.gov/indiantrust/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2002).
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Individual Indian Money accounts and the specific problems associated
with reformation of this system. By analyzing the federal government's
trustee/beneficiary relationship with the Individual Indian Money
beneficiaries, a number of concerns arise. The 1994 Reform Act and the
current state of the Cobell lawsuit provide an analysis of the problems
associated with the IIM accounts. This Comment considers the historical
relationship between the federal government and Native Americans in
light of the current trust relationship and provides insight into how and
why this relationship has deteriorated to its current state. This Comment
analyzes several proposed solutions to the problems and assesses their
viability. Finally, this Comment concludes that the measures necessary
to reach any type of beneficial resolution will come first, through
settlement and second, through the creation of a receivership, which will
monitor the reformation process until it has concluded in the
development of a functional trust system.
I. LEGISLATIVE AND COMMON LAW ROOTS OF THE TRUST
RELATIONSHIP

For the better part of the nineteenth century, United States policy
toward Native Americans focused primarily on removal and relocation."
In the 1880s, this policy shifted to one of assimilation.12 The primary
11. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 154155 (3d ed. 2000) (providing numerous pieces of legislation aimed at removal and
relocation of Native American tribes off of their Native lands). See Indian Removal Act,
May 28, 1830, pg. 52; President Jackson on Indian Removal, Dec. 7, 1835, pg. 70; Indian
Commissioner Lea on Reservation Policy, Nov. 27, 1850, pg. 81. The Cherokee cases
provide the most clear context of removal. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831). This case concerned a situation in which the state of Georgia had given up claims
to western lands in exchange for a federal guarantee that Native American land titles
within Georgia would be extinguished. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 14 (3d ed. 1998). In response to the federal government's failure to
act on its promise, Georgia enacted a series of laws that attempted to undercut the
sovereignty of the Cherokee nation. Id. In taking its case to the United States Supreme
Court, the Cherokee nation was deemed by Chief Justice Marshall as a "domestic
dependent," which in turn provided for a "doctrinal basis for protection of the tribes by
the federal government." Id. at 15-16. However, the Court's holding provided little
support for the Cherokee cause in light of President Andrew Jackson's commitment to
remove Native Americans to the West. Id. at 15. By 1835, President Jackson's policy of
"removing the aboriginal people who yet remain within the settled portions of the United
States to the country west of the Mississippi River" was already in progress. See President
Jackson on Indian Removal, December 7, 1835, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, at 70-72 (Francis Paul Prucha, 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
The concept of relocation focused primarily on the establishment of reservations that were
designed to separate Natives and non-Natives in order to assure peace between them.
CANBY, supra, at 18-19; see infra note 12.
12. See Indian Commissioner Price on Civilizing the Indians, Extracted from the
Annual Report of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Oct. 24, 1881, in DOCUMENTS,
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objective was "to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation
boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into [the] society at
large. 1 3 Under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, sometimes
referred to as the Dawes Act, the federal government, in an attempt to
further the assimilation process, provided for conversion of tribal lands
into individual allotments that would vest to individual Indians with the
United States as trustee.'4 The Dawes Act provided that the federal
government would hold the allotments of land in trust for a minimum of
twenty-five years, and then, at the conclusion of that time period, a fee
patent"s would be granted to individual Indian allottees. 16 During this
"trust period" the government was responsible for implementing and
managing accounts for each individual Indian. 17 Government approval
was required if Indians wanted to sell, lease, or otherwise burden their
supra note 11, at 154-55. Commissioner Price's comments primarily focused on a policy of
assimilation whereby "the laws that govern a white man govern the Indian." Id. at 155.
Price's comments also foreshadow a number of problems currently seen with respect to
the IIM accounts. Commissioner Price stated:
To domesticate and civilize wild Indians is noble work .. .which should be a
crown of glory to any nation. But to allow them to drag along year after year,
and generation after generation, in their old superstitions, laziness, and filth,
when we have the power to elevate them in the scale of humanity, would be a
lasting disgrace to our government.
Id. at 154.
13. Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,254 (1992).
14. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887),
amended by 25 U.S.C. § 331.
15. The fee patent is described as "a grant of land from the public domain (that is,
public land holdings) by the federal or state governments." GARY A. SOKOLOW, NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 90 (2000). With respect to the General
Allotment Act, the fee patent refers to the "issuance of a deed, or title, to land formerly
held by the U.S. government, to individual members of an Indian Tribe." Id. By the early
1900s, the use of the "forced fee patent" by the federal government became widespread in
an attempt to further "civilize" the Native American tribes. Id. at 90-91. The "forced fee
patent" was utilized by a federal competency commission (acting on behalf of the
Secretary of the Interior) as a means of removing the trust status of Native American
lands. Id. at 91. If the federal competency commission made the determination that an
individual allottee was capable of handling its business affairs, it would declare that land to
be held in fee patent by the individual allottee, regardless of whether the allottee wanted
it. Id. When a fee patent was granted, that land would then become subject to the same
local "regulations, mortgages, and taxation" to which ordinary parcels of land were
subject. Id.
16. SOKOLOW, supra note 15, at 90-91; Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
17. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. Today these accounts, which serve as the focal point of
this Comment, are referred to as Individual Indian Money (1IM) accounts. SOKOLOW,
supra note 15, at 145. Income generated from the sale or lease of allotments -as well as
revenues generated from the sale of oil, gas, timber, mineral resources, and the like-is
deposited in trust with the federal government for the benefit of individual Native
Americans. Id.
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lands."j Under the Dawes Act, about two-thirds of all Indian land was
removed from Indian ownership.' 9 By 1934, it had become evident that
the concept of assimilation and the accompanying allotment process was
not successful and further reformation of the U.S. Government-Native
20
American relationship was necessary.
A. FirstAttempts at Reform: Indian ReorganizationAct of 1934
The Implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
("IRA") concluded the process of allotting to individual Indians and
provided that those lands that had not yet been allotted would be
returned to tribal ownership. 2' The lands allotted prior to the enactment
of IRA would remain in trust with the United States indefinitely.22
Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted in
Cobell v. Norton that "[tihe federal government retained control of lands
already allotted but not yet fee-patented and thereby retained its
fiduciary obligations to administer the trust lands and funds arising from
those lands for the benefit of individual Indian beneficiaries. 2 3 These
lands, and the funds arising therefrom, are the focal point of the
24
controversy and form the basis of the IIM accounts.
B. Formationof the Modern Day Trust Relationship
1. Seminole Nation v. United States: Growth of the United States'
FiduciaryDuties
In 1942, the nature of the trust relationship between the United States
and Native Americans took another turn. In Seminole Nation v. United
States, 5 the Supreme Court held that the United States trust relationship
with Native Americans encompassed a fiduciary responsibility with

18. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.
19. Id. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the effects of the "forced fee patent."
20. Billee Elliot McAuliffe, Forcing Action: Seeking to "Clean Up" the Indian Trust
Fund: Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998), 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 647, 652 (2001)
("In 1934, Congress, realizing that the GAA process of giving the Indians the land in fee
simple was not reaching its objectives, enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.").
21. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, 463(a) (2000). This Act favored the
approach of "releas[ing] the Indian tribes from federal supervision and terminat[ing] the
government-Indian relationship." Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. This policy aimed specifically
at "severing the ... trust relationship." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cobell v.
Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (1999)).
22. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see supra note 17.
25. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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respect to its management of the Indian Trust Fund.26 Seminole Nation
arose out of claims by tribal members that tribal leaders were misusing
the disbursement of trust fund monies.27 The United States Supreme
Court did not rest at merely establishing the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, but went on to state that:
[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these
dependent and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out its
treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a
humane and self imposed policy which has found expression in
many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it
has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of
those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should
28
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
This demanding standard placed on the federal government in its role as
trustee provided the benchmark for what is to be expected from the
federal government in its dealings with Native Americans.
2. The Indian Self-Determinationand Education Assistance Act of 1975
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975
represents the current policy of "'self-determination and selfgovernance" and "authorizes tribes to assume some of the management
functions currently imposed on the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA")
and Office of Trust Fund Management.29 In particular, a tribe may
contract with BIA to manage trust accounts, including the IIM accounts,
for the tribe or its members."
The BIA is charged with ensuring that

26. See id. at 296-97.
27. Id. at 295 (discussing reports from the Dawes Commission "that the governments
of the Five Civilized Tribes were notoriously and incurably corrupt, that every branch of
the service was infested with favoritism, graft and crookedness").
28. Id. at 296-97.
29. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (1999); Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (Jan. 4, 1975), in DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 275. The
purpose of this Act was to "provide for the full participation of Indian tribes in programs
and services conducted by the federal government." Id. The Act further provides that the
longstanding "federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard rather
than enhance the progress of Indian people," and in turn "has denied [Native American
people] an effective voice in the planning and implementation of programs," which were

initially designed for their benefit. Id.
30. Cobell, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001); DOCUMENTS, supra note 11 at 275.
Section 104(a)(1) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
provides that:
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contracting tribes possess sufficient "accounting or management
capabilities" necessary to comply with a proposed contract.
If it is
determined that the tribe lacks such capabilities, the BIA is authorized
"to assist tribes in developing the necessary capabilities to manage IIM
accounts themselves."32 As such, the fiduciary obligations of the BIA
associated with trust account management mandate that the BIA be
certain a tribe can meet its own fiduciary obligations prior to transferring
control. 3
3. United States v. Mitchell (I & II)
More than twenty years ago, the trust responsibilities of the United
States began to take their current form.34 In 1980, Native American
allottees of the Quinault Tribe sued the federal government to recover
damages resulting from the alleged mismanagement of timber resources
on the Quinault Reservation.
In United States v. Mitchell I, the United
States Supreme Court initially held that the General Allotment Act
"created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and
the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the government to

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, upon the request of any Indian tribe
.. to contract with or make a grant or grants to any tribal organization for...
the strengthening or improvement of tribal government []including but not
limited to, the development, improvement, and administration of planning,
financial management, or merit personal systems ......
Id. at 276.
31. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1088; DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 276. Section 102(a) of
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act provides that the Secretary
of the Interior may decline to enter into a contract with an Indian tribe if he determines:
(1) the service to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular
program or function to be contracted will not be satisfactory; (2) adequate
protection of trust resources is not assured, or (3) the proposed project or
function to be contracted cannot be properly completed or maintained by the
proposed contract.
Id. Furthermore, in considering the proposed contract, the Secretary of the Interior is
required to consider whether the tribe possesses adequate equipment, bookkeeping and
accounting procedures, trained personnel, and other necessary components, which would
enable it to perform under the contract. Id. If the Secretary determines that the contract
is not feasible, then he must provide that tribe with information necessary to overcome
any shortcomings, to allow for hearings, and to provide an opportunity to appeal any
decision that has been made. Id.
32. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1088.
33. Id.
34. McAuliffe, supra note 20, at 654-55.
35. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980). Specifically, the allottees
asserted that the federal government failed to recover the fair market value for timber
sold, did not rehabilitate the land after logging, charged excessive administrative fees to
the allottees, and did not pay interest on certain funds. Id. at 537.
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manage timber resources. 3 6 Three years later, in United States v.
Mitchell /,37 the Supreme Court further clarified the issue, holding that
although the General Allotment Act did not expressly state that the
government owed a fiduciary duty to manage resources on Indian lands,
a trust duty did arise from several prior statutes and regulations.38 The
Court held that even though it is not expressly stated in the underlying
statutes, the government assumed the fiduciary obligations as trustee in
connection with the individual Indian trust accounts.3 9 The Mitchell II
Court went on to explain that "a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises
when the government assumes such elaborate control" over resources
and revenues generated from Native American lands.40
C. IIM Account-Related FiduciaryResponsibilitiesof the Federal
Government: Department of the Interior, Treasury Department,and
Bureau of Indian Affairs
The Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Treasury Department
(Treasury) play significant roles in the administration of the
government's trust responsibilities.4 ' The primary role of the DOI is to
oversee the trust responsibilities
that are directly carried out by
S 42
numerous sub-agencies. These agencies include, but are not limited to,
the BIA, the Office of Trust Fund Management (OTFM), and the Office
of Special Trustee (OST). 43 Through these sub-agencies, the DOI is

36. Id. at 542. The Court held that the General Allotment Act did not establish a
fiduciary responsibility for the United States with respect to allotted lands. Id. at 545.
37. Mitchell If, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
38. Id. at 225. The Court cited the Act of June 25, 1910, (which "empowered the
Secretary [of the Interior] to sell timber on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the
sales for the benefit of the Indians"); the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, (which in
part "imposed even stricter duties upon the Government with respect to Indian Timber
management"); and the timber management statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, and 466,
(which "establish the 'comprehensive' responsibilities of the federal government in
managing the harvesting of Indian timber"). Id. at 219-22.
39. Id. at 225. The Court explained that all the necessary elements of a common law
trust existed: "a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust
corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds"). Id. See also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 624 F. 2d 981 (Cl. Ct. 1980).
40. Mitchell I,463 U.S. 225.
41. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The United States is
considered trustee of the IIM accounts. Id. However, under current law, the Secretaries
of the Interior and Treasury are considered the trustee-delegates. Id. "Each Secretary, or
his designates has specific fiduciary responsibilities that must be fulfilled lest the United
States breach its fiduciary obligations." Id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
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charged with the responsibility of maintaining an accurate account of all
individual IIM trusts.44
The BIA,45 under the authority of the DOI, is responsible for the
management
the approval of leases and transfers of land,
and inomeof trust
• lands,
46
and income collection. Individual beneficiaries are paid income derived
from trust lands either directly to their accounts, or to "special deposit
4
accounts" where the money is not distributed directly to the individual.
The BIA is also charged with the duty to contract with the tribes for the
management of the IIM accounts. 48 The BIA performed and approved
the majority of transactions concerning the IIM accounts.49
The Treasury, in conjunction with the OTFM, holds and invests the
IIM accounts and provides for accounting and financial management of
the funds.5 ° Treasury maintains a single IIM account for all IIM funds,
whereas the OTFM maintains individualized accounts." For accounting
purposes, the OTFM utilizes the Treasury's accounting records to
reconcile its own IIM records. "2
II. INDIAN TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 1994

Misplaced Trust, a 1992 report generated from a Congressional
Oversight Hearing, placed a great deal of blame on the DOI and BIA for

44. See id. Specifically, these sub-agencies are responsible for the approval of all
lease and land transfers, income collection (i.e. deposits from land revenues), and the
disbursement of money to the IIM account holders. Id.
45. Created without Congressional approval by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun,
on March 11, 1824, the BIA was initially responsible for numerous financial activities
associated with the Native American-U.S. relationship, C.L. Henson, From War to SelfDetermination:
A
History
of
the
Bureau
of
Indian
Affairs,
at
http://www.americansc.org.ukonline/indians.htm
(last
visited
Oct.
8,
2003).
Responsibilities included: appropriations for annuities and current expenses, examination
and approval of all vouchers for expenditures, administration of funding for the
civilization of the Indians, and deciding claims arising between Indians and whites, as well
as handling the ordinary Indian correspondence of the War Department. Id. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) is one of the oldest agencies in the U.S. government. Id.
Congress transferred the BIA to the Department of the Interior in 1849. Id. Soon after
this transfer came changes in responsibilities and policy. Id. During the assimilation era,
one of the primary concerns of the BIA was the administration of allotments. Id.
46. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1088.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
49. See Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1088
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1089.
52. Id.
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the poor state of the IIM trusts.53 Misplaced Trust found "significant,
habitual problems in BIA's ability to fully and accurately account for
trust fund moneys, to properly discharge its fiduciary responsibilities, and
to prudently manage the trust fund have been well documented over the
years., 54 The report provided that, as a result of the widespread and
invasive nature of mismanagement problems, the prospect for some type
of substantial reform effort in the future was unlikely.55
The
Congressional Oversight Committee concluded in part that:
[Close congressional oversight and supervision of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Department of the Interior have failed
to effect fundamental improvements in the Bureau's
management of the . . . Indian trust fund.

The committee is

skeptical that either the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the
Department of the Interior will take the resolute action
necessary to solve the structural problems that have besieged
the financial management of the Indian trust fund for decades;
that they will . . . develop a commitment to fulfilling their

statutory role as a competent fiduciary and sophisticated
trustee. Indeed the committee is skeptical that any reform
package developed by Bureau personnel will be adequate to
assure Congress, the public, or the native American community
that the Department and the Bureau are committed to, and will
be successful
in, professionally competent
financial
management of the Indian
trust
fund
or
restoring
the
Bureau's
56
administrative credibility.
In light of this critical assessment of the BIA and DOI's handling of
their trust responsibilities, the committee allowed for a "reasonable
period of time for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of
the Interior to show demonstrable improvement in the financial
53. See generally Committee on Government Operations,Misplaced Trust: The Bureau
of Indian Affairs' Mismanagementof the Indian Trust Fund, H.R. REP. No. 102-499 (1992).
The specific problems and deficiencies cited by the report are:
(1) inadequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund balances; (2)
inadequate controls over receipts and disbursements; (3) absence of periodic,
timely reconciliations to assure accuracy of accounts; (4) inability to determine
accurate cash balances; failure to consistently and prudently invest trust funds
and/or pay interest to accountholders; (5) inability to prepare and supply
accountholders with meaningful periodic statements of their account balances;
(6) absence of consistent, written policies and procedures for trust fund
management and accounting; and (7) inadequate staffing, supervision, and
training.
Id. at 59.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 65-66.
56. Id.

2004]

Indian Trust Fund

The committee further
management of the Indian trust fund.""
stipulated that if no "demonstrable improvement" was shown within six
to nine months that Congress should consider the possibility
of
58
transferring the trust responsibilities to another federal agency.
A. CongressionalRecognition of Trust Responsibilities
As a direct result of the Misplaced Trust report, Congress enacted the
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994'9 (1994 Reform
Act) as a means of addressing the specific problems associated with
mismanagement of the IIM accounts. 6° The 1994 Reform Act recognized
the pre-existing trust responsibilities of the federal government, while
clarifying those duties assigned to the Secretary of the Interior as
ensuring the "proper discharge of the trust responsibilities of the United
States."6 1 Several of the key components of the 1994 Reform Act
provide for the creation of "adequate systems for the accounting and

reporting of trust fund balances," the implementation an accountsreceivable system, the timely reconciliation of the accounts, and the
establishment of "consistent, written
policies and procedures for trust
62

fund management and accounting.

57. Id. at 66.
58. Id. at 66. The report listed the Federal Reserve Board as one potential alternative
agency that could serve as fiscal agent for the trust fund. Id.
59. American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4061 (2000).
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 4041. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, stated that the 1994 Reform Act was "a remedial statute designed to ensure more
diligent enforcement of the government's obligations." Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081,
1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2000).
62. Id. The Act provides for the recognition of trust responsibilities and specifies
those trust responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of the Interior:
The Secretary's proper discharge of the trust responsibilities of the United States
shall include-but are not limited to-the following:
(1) Providing adequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund
balances.
(2) Providing adequate controls over receipts and disbursements.
(3) Providing periodic, timely reconciliation to assure the accuracy of accounts.
(4) Determining accurate cash balances.
(5) Preparing and supplying account holders with periodic statements of their
account performance and with balances of their account which
shall be available on a daily basis.
(6) Establishing consistent, written policies and procedures for trust fund
management and accounting.
(7) Providing adequate staffing, supervision, and training for trust fund
management and accounting.
(8) Appropriately managing the natural resources located within the boundaries
of Indian reservations and trust lands.
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Title II of the 1994 Reform Act concerns the Indian Trust Fund
Management Program and stipulates that its purpose is "to allow tribes
an opportunity to manage tribal funds currently held in trust by the
United States .

.

.

consistent

.

.

.

with the principles

of self-

determination. 63 Specifically, the Act attempts to provide tribes with
greater control over the management of their trust funds.64 Section 202
of the Act provides for voluntary withdrawal from the trust fund
program and the ability to contract with the federal government. 5
Title III of the 1994 Reform Act creates the Office of the Special
Trustee for American Indians ("OST") "to provide for more effective
management of, and accountability for[,] the proper discharge, of the
Secretary's trust responsibilities." 66 The Special Trustee is charged with
the responsibility of creating a "'comprehensive strategic plan' for trust
management reform and an appropriate reform timetable to ensure
'proper and efficient discharge of the Secretary's trust responsibilities.' ' 61
The responsibilities granted to the Special Trustee pertain only to the
"general oversight" of the trust responsibilities, with the real decisionId.
63. § 4021. This section allows the tribes an "opportunity to manage tribal funds ...
held in trust by the United States." This section specifically seeks to provide tribes with a
greater degree of control over the management of the trust funds, or in the alternate,
provide for measures that will allow tribes to become more involved in the management of
the trust funds in a manner that is consistent with the trust responsibilities that already
apply to the United States as trustee. Id. §4021(1).
64. Id. § 4022
65. Id. The Act states that an "Indian tribe may ... submit a plan to withdraw some
or all funds held in trust." Id. § 4022(a). It further stipulates that in the event that a tribe
elects to withdrawal funds, the trust responsibilities of the United States with respect to
those funds will cease. Id. § 4022(c). Under the Act, a tribe also has the right to return
any or all of the trust funds that had previously been withdrawn, thus redeeming the
United States trust responsibilities. Id. § 4026. It further provides that any plan submitted
on behalf of either a tribe or the Secretary of the Interior would not constitute an
acceptance of the account balance as accurate, or waive any rights regarding the account
balance. Id. § 4027.
66. Id. §4041. Title III provides that the purpose behind the creation of the Special
Trustee is to:
[P]rovide for more effective management of, and accountability for the proper
discharge of, the Secretary's trust responsibilities to Indian tribes and individual
Indians by establishing in the Department of the Interior and Office of Special
Trustee for American Indians to oversee and coordinate reforms within the
Department of practices relating to the management and discharge of such
responsibilities.
Id. § 4041(1). The Act provides that the reform practices to be carried out in the DOI are
also to be uniformly implemented within the BIA, Minerals Management Service, and
Bureau of Land Management. Id. § 4041(2)
67. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 25 U.S.C. §
4043(a)(1)).
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making authority over the IIM residing with the Secretary of the
Interior."
In April 1997, Paul Homan, the first Special Trustee appointed under
the 1994 Reform Act, proposed a "strategic plan" to the Secretary of the
Interior and Congress. 69 This strategic plan was composed of twelve
subprojects designed to "[ensure] the accuracy of information regarding
the IIM trust accounts and developing uniform policies and procedures
to guide trust management in the future."70 The Secretary chose to

68. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 4043(b)(1)).
69. Id.
70. Id. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DOI TRUST
REFORM: TRUST REFORM FINAL REPORT AND ROADMAP (2002) [hereinafter DOI
TRUST REFORM]; Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). The strategic plan
proposed by Special Trustee Homan, subsequently adopted by the DOI, consists of a
number of specific subprojects. Id. These subprojects are identified individually as High
Level Implementation Plans ("HLIPs") and consist of the following:
HLIP 1: OST'S IIM Administrative Data Cleanup. This plan deals primarily with
beneficiaries' vital information such as names, addresses, and Social Security numbers.
Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d, at 14. The primary objective here is to reconcile data contained on
two separate electronic databases: the Integrated Records Management System ("IRMS")
and the Land Record Information Systems ("LRIS"). Id. By correcting problems and
discrepancies associated with these databases and related paper records, the DOI aimed to
accurately identify beneficiaries and locate correct mailing addresses for payment
purposes. Id. at 15.
HLIP 2: BIA Data Cleanup and Management. The primary purpose of this plan is to
enable the BIA to "have a level of data in the system that allows for proper land title
records and every allottee and every tribe to receive the correct dollars that they're
supposed to get." Id. The system that is touted to be the solution to the problems
associated with data cleanup is the Trust Asset & Accounting Management System
("TAAMS") computer system.
HLIP 3: Probate Backlog. The probate backlog consists of approximately 12,000 cases in
which probates have affected the land interests in the IIM trusts. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at
17. These land interests are utilized in order to assure that payment amounts are made to
the correct beneficiaries. Id. The purpose of this plan is to identify and develop
procedures to eliminate the current probate backlog and ensure the proper administration
of the IIM trust accounts. Id. at 17-18; DOI TRUST REFORM at 45.
HLIP 4: BIA Appraisals. As of 1999, approximately 212,000 title defects needed to be
addressed in order to render an accounting. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 18. This "appraisal
backlog" would be eliminated in order to determine the processing of leases, which is an
essential part of rendering an accounting. Id.
HLIP 5: Trust Fund Accounting Systems ("TFAS"). TFAS is described as a "commercialoff-the-shelf trust fund financial management ... system." Id. Assuming that TFAS is
properly integrated with other critical computer systems, it would serve as a means of
accurately tracking disbursements, receipts, and securities. Id. Furthermore, TFAS would
"handle the pricing or evaluation of securities; produce accurate account statements; keep
and update correct names and addresses; reconcile accounts; . . .and enforce internal
controls through the use of passwords." Id.
HLIP 6: TAAMS. The purpose of TAAMS is to enable the BIA to "administer trust
assets, generate timely bills, identify delinquent payments, track income from trust assets,
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implement a number of the proposed provisions through the High Level
Implementation Plan ("HLIP"). 7' This plan attempted to facilitate the
reform measures by upgrading the computer systems, cleaning up trust
records, and eliminating process backlogs.72 Unfortunately, neither
Congress nor the Office of the Special Trustee sought, or provided for,
sufficient funding of the 1994 Reform Act in order to provide for HLIP.73
The concerns addressed in the Special Trustee's HLIP proposals laid the

and distribute proceeds to the appropriate account holders." Id. at 19. Like TFAS,
however, the success of TAAMS will depend largely on the reliability and accuracy of the
information that entered into the system and the proper integration of related trusts
systems. Id.
HLIP 7: Mineral Management Systems ("MMS") Reengineering. MMS is responsible for
collecting royalties from all mineral resources within Native American trust lands. DOI
TRUST REFORM at 88. Those royalties collected are then sent to the BIA and OTFM in
order to then be disbursed to the appropriate IIM account. Id. Reengineering this system
would consist of the development and implementation of a new business system which
would focus specifically on "financial and compliance aspects of royalty management." Id.
HLIP 8: Records Management.
The primary objective with respect to records
management is to develop "a coherent plan for the proper retrieval and management of
trust documents." Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d 20. The scope of the problems associated with
proper records management of trust documents has most recently been revealed through
the discovery phases of the Cobell litigation. See infra note 108.
HLIP 9: Policies and Procedures. The main objective of this HLIP is to ensure that
"consistent, standard methods of achieving business results" are implemented, while at the
same time allowing for "continuous improvement."
DOI TRUST REFORM at 106.
Pursuant to the 1994 Reform Act, "policies, procedures, practices and systems of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Minerals
Management Service" that are associated with the DOI's trust responsibilities need to be
"coordinated, consistent, and integrated" between all agencies. Id.
HLIP 10: Training. The training plan pertains to DOI Trust Management employees, with
specific reference to "specialized skills training" that is required for the overall Trust
reform effort. Id. at 116. Training would be centered on TFAS and TAAMS system
implementation. Id.
HLIP 11: Internal Controls. Internal control is described as being synonymous with
management controls, and "comprises the plans, methods and procedures used to meet
missions, goals and objectives." Id. at 126.
71. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1091.
72. See supra note 70.
73. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1092.

20041

Indian Trust Fund

groundwork7 4 for what has become "the largest class-action suit ever filed
by Indians."75

III. COBELL V. NORTON
On June 10, 1996, a class-action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia "in an attempt to force the
government to account for billions of dollars held in trust for
approximately 500,000 American Indians since the early nineteenth
century."71
The lawsuit alleged that the federal government
(including
the
Secretaries
of
the
Interior
and Treasury) had "breached the fiduciary duties77 owed to

74. The trust duties of the United States that were codified in the 1994 Reform Act
identify the specific areas of concern that the Secretary of the Interior is required to
address. See Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1091. The United States' alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
claimed by the Cobell plaintiffs, directly relates to the "'proper and efficient discharge of
the Secretary's trust responsibilities,"' as proscribed by the 1994 Reform Act. Id. The
effectiveness of the "'comprehensive strategic plan"' or HLIP, demanded by the 1994
Reform Act, in turn directly relates to the Secretary's successful performance of her trust
responsibilities. Id.
75. Timothy Egan, A Computer Shutdown Plays Havoc at Interior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2002, at A20.
76. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1092-93; Cobell v. Norton: An Overview, available at
http://www.lndianTrust.com/overview.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) provides an
overview of the aforementioned case from the filing of the class-action lawsuit to the
present phase of the litigation.
77. Keith Harper, Plaintiffs' Counsel in Cobell v. Norton litigation, Discussion of the
IIM Trust Fund Litigation at the Catholic University of America School of Law (Nov. 22,
2002). The discussion focused on the decision by plaintiffs in the Cobell case to apply the
law of trusts and focus on the breach of fiduciary duty by the federal government as
opposed to focusing on administrative law aspects of the current controversy. Id. By
applying trust law, the plaintiffs were capable of getting their case into a federal District
Court, which applies the law of equity. Id. This in turn allowed plaintiffs to present their
case under a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Id. By presenting the case in this manner,
plaintiffs have avoided the complexities associated with administrative law challenges, and
centered their argument around the less complex aspects of trust law (i.e., viewing the IIM
beneficiaries as any regular beneficiary, and the failure to render an accurate accounting
by the federal government as a typical case of a breach of it fiduciary duties). Id.
Defendants here argue that administrative law should apply to this case, and that as such,
the federal district court lacks jurisdiction. See Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 149
(D.D.C. 2002). Under this theory, the defendants argue that the agencies (DOI and
Treasury) handling the IIM accounts have not issued a "final agency action" as required
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and in turn are not reviewable by this court.
Id. The APA states that "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). In rejecting the
defendants argument, the district court cited several examples in which federal courts have
had "jurisdiction to hear challenges to an agency action" where there are "claims of
unreasonable delay" as in the case at hand. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 149 (citing
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plaintiffs 8 by mismanaging the IIM trust accounts., 79
The dual purposes of this litigation, filed by Eloise Cobell, 8 were to
force the federal government to (1) "bring about permanent reform of
the system," and (2) to provide an accurate historical accounting of the
trust fund money."' The case was subsequently bifurcated along these
lines.82 The first phase of the trial, which focused on reforming the
Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984));
see also Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The district court
further held that "it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims ... pursuant to
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . finding that '[t]he case law and
legislative history with respect to § 702 clearly evince the federal government's consent to
suit in the present case." See Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 15. Section 702 "eliminate[s] the
defense of sovereign immunity in cases in which the plaintiffs are seeking 'other than
money damages."' WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.04
(Lexis Publishing, 4th ed. 2000). In shooting down the government's argument of
sovereign immunity pursuant to APA § 702, Judge Lamberth held that the plaintiffs were
"only seek[ing] to balance the checkbook, not to add any money to the checking account."
Cobell v. Norton, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24 (1998). Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 47, discussing the fact
that DOJ attempted to "get out from under the heavy equitable thumb of the District
Court and into the claims court, which typically handles Indian suits for damages." Id.
Nell Jessup Newton, Dean of the University of Denver College of Law, stated that
"Indians can't win in the court of claims, so the government always tries to get the case
moved into the court of claims." Id. (referring to the court of claims as "notoriously
stingy with Indians").
78. Cobell v. Norton, (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1997) (No. 1:96 CV 01285) (Order Certifying
Class Action). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2),
plaintiffs in this "class consist of present and former beneficiaries of [IIM] accounts." The
court further found that the prosecution or adjudication of individual actions on this
matter would result in inconsistent standards for the defendants to follow. Id. at 1-2.
79. See Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1092-93 (2001); see also Cobell, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
1998); Indian Trust: Cobell v. Norton: An Overview at http://www.IndianTrust.com/
overview.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
80. Lead plaintiff Eloise Cobell is a member of the Blackfeet Tribe in Montana and is
the founder and current Chair of the Blackfeet National Bank. Indian Trust: Cobell v.
Norton, Biography of Eloise Cobell at http://www/IndianTrust.com/bio.cfm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2002). With a background in accounting, Ms. Cobell played a key role in the
formation of "the Blackfeet National Bank, the first national bank located on an Indian
reservation and owned by a Native American tribe." Id.
81. Indian Trust, supra note 79.
82. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1093. The case was bifurcated on May 5, 1998 into two phases.
Phase I addressed "'fixing the system' or reforming the management and accounting of the
IIM trusts so as to meet the federal government's fiduciary responsibilities." Id. Phase II,
which has yet to begin, will attempt to "address historical accounting of the accounts." Id.
In September 2002, Judge Lamberth ordered that the case's trifurcation and concluded
that a Phase one and a half would be necessary due to the DOl's inability to comply with
the previous court orders regarding the implementation of an effective trust reform
system. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2002). Judge Lamberth
stated that "[t]he recalcitrance exhibited by Department of Interior in complying with the
orders of this Court is only surpassed by the incompetence that the agency has shown in
administering the IIM trust." Id. at 148.
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system, found that the Secretaries of the Interior and Treasury had
breached their trust obligations to the IIM account holders.83 In an effort
to ensure compliance with court orders, Judge Lamberth retained control
over the case.m In addition, Judge Lamberth appointed a special master
to oversee the preservation and production of trust-related documents
and a federal monitor to provide the judge with an assessment of the
Interior's execution of trust reform.85 Over a year and a half after Judge
Lamberth's 1999 order,m which demanded an accurate historical
accounting of IIM funds, the DOI's efforts have been described as "still
at the starting gates" and marked with "unrealistic responses and

evasion . 87

Criticism of the DOI and the Treasury Department's progress
following the implementation of the 1994 Reform Act was not confined
to the judiciary. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), stated that the DOI's
management of the Indian trust system, under the direction of Secretary
Babbitt, was "[w]orse than anyone could ever imagine., 88 McCain added
that if a situation such as this was affecting any other group of

83. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1093-94. The December 21, 1999 ruling, which found that the
federal government had specifically breached some of its fiduciary duties to the Indians,
concluded the following: "Under the 1994 Act [the federal government] must provide IIM
trust beneficiaries with 'an accurate accounting of all money in the IM trust ... without
regard to when the funds were deposited." That in addition, under the 1994 Reform Act,
the federal government must "retrieve and retain all information concerning the IIM trust
that is necessary to render an accurate accounting." Id. at 1093 (citing Cobell, 91 F. Supp.
2d at 58). The court also found that the Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant
Secretary must provide "written polices and procedures" that provide for the collection of
missing information, the retention of IIM trust documents, and the creation of a computer
and business system necessary for an accurate accounting. Id. at 1094 (citing Cobell, 91 F.
Supp. 2d at 58). Finally, the court held that "the Treasury Secretary owes the IIM trust
beneficiaries 'the statutory trust duty to retain IlM trust documents." Id. (citing Cobell, 91
F. Supp. 2d at 58).
84. Indian Trust, supra note 79. By retaining control, Judge Lamberth further sought
to ensure successful overhaul of the system, and that the DOI follow through with
rendering an accurate historical accounting of all trust fund moneys. Id.
85. Id.
86. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999).
87. Indian Trust, supra note 79. Because DOI officials failed to take the case
seriously when it was first filed in 1996, little progress initially was made in Cobell.
Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 41 (1999) (providing in part that the "case either could have been
settled or dismissed long ago had it not been for the government's initial failure to take it
seriously."). When the Department of Justice first received the case, it initially assigned
two lawyers to it. Id. Today, there are approximately sixty attorneys assisting in the case
on behalf of the federal government. Harper, supra note 77.
88. 60 Minutes: Broken Promises; U.S. Government's Mismanagement of Indian
Nations' Moneys (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 2, 2000) (interview by Mike Wallace of
Senator John McCain (R-AZ), a member of the Indian Affairs Committee, discussing the
problems associated with the Indian trust system).
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Americans, "there would be an outcry, there'd be lawsuits, there'd be...
a national scandal."8 9

IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO RENDER AN
ACCURATE ACCOUNTING AND TO REFORM THE IIM TRUST SYSTEM
A February 23, 2001 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court provided:
The government's broad duty to provide a complete historical
accounting to IIM beneficiaries necessarily imposes substantial
subsidiary duties on those government officials with
responsibility for ensuring that an accounting can and will take
place. In particular, it imposes obligations on those who
administer the IIM trust lands and funds to, among other things,
maintain and complete existing records, recover missing records
where possible, and develop plans and procedures sufficient to
ensure
that all aspects of the accounting process are carried
9

out.

A recent opinion and order by Judge Lamberth provides insight into the
degree with which the federal government has fallen short of meeting its
fiduciary obligations. 9' Judge Lamberth stated that the "Department of
the Interior's administration of the Individual Indian Money trust has
served as the gold standard for mismanagement by the federal

89. Id. Representative Tom Udall of New Mexico was discussing the unjust
treatment of the trust fund holders when he recently stated that "[i]f 40,000 people were
cut off Social Security, there would be an uproar in Congress." Ellen Nakashima & Neely
Tucker, Lost Trust: Billions Go Uncounted; Indians in Century-Old Fight to Tally Money
Owed for Land Use, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2002, at Al.
90. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081,1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
91. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 161-63 (D.D.C. 2002). A primary concern is
the Department of the Interior's conduct during the course of the Cobell litigation. Id. A
recent decision by Judge Lamberth found that current Secretary of the Interior Gale
Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb committed four counts of fraud. Id. They were
held in contempt of court for engaging in litigation misconduct and failing to initiate the
accounting that had been ordered. Id. This, however, was not the first instance of
misconduct by DOI that the court noted. In February 1999, then-Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbit and then-Assitant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover were held in
civil contempt for violating two of the court's discovery orders. Cobell v. Norton, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1999). Judge Lamberth stated that "the Department of Interior has
handled this litigation the same way that it has managed the IIM trust-disgracefully."
Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 11. Along similar lines, Dennis M. Gingold, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, has proposed that Judge Lamberth consider jailing those individuals involved in
a recent case of alleged retaliation against a BIA employee that had criticized the DOI's
trust reform efforts. Bill Miller, Retaliation Alleged at Interior: Special Master Says
Whistle-Blower in Indian Case Punished, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2001, at A17. The incident
involved the demotion of Mona Infield, a computer specialist at the BIA, apparently in
retaliation for exposing problems associated with the BIA's lack of progress in its efforts
to reform the trust system. Id.

2004]

Indian Trust Fund

government." 92 Specifically, Judge Lamberth noted that the Secretary of
the Interior, Gale Norton, was unable to determine the number of IIM
trust accounts, how much money should be in the trust, and the correct
balances for the individual accounts. 93 Furthermore, Judge Lamberth
stated that the federal government "regularly issue[d] payments to
beneficiaries of their own money in erroneous amounts., 94 This brief
synopsis of the problems associated with the IIM trust accounts
oversimplifies a problem that has resulted from decades of neglect and

mismanagement.95
In a recent hearing before the United States Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, Paul M. Homan, former Special Trustee for American
Indians, stated that the primary cause of trust mismanagement and
neglect was a "lack of competent managerial resources to manage
92. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
93. Id. at 11. In February of 2001, the D.C. Circuit Court stated:
The federal government does not know the precise number of IIM trust accounts
that it is to administer and protect. At present, the Interior Department's system
contains over 300,000 accounts covering an estimated 11 million acres, but the
Department is unsure whether this is the proper number of accounts ....

Not

only does the Interior department not know the proper number of accounts, it
does not know the proper balances for each IIM account, nor does Interior have
sufficient
records
to
determine
the
value
of
IIM
accounts
....
Current account reconciliation procedures are insufficient to ensure that
existing account records, reported account balances, or payments to IIM
beneficiaries are accurate ....

As a result, the government regularly issues

payments to trust beneficiaries "in erroneous amounts-from unreconciled
accounts-some of which are known to have incorrect balances."
Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1089 (quoting in part Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 6).
94. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (D.D.C. 2002).
95. The problems associated with providing an accurate historical accounting and
reformation of the system reveal only one side of the situation at hand. The longstanding
problems associated with the IIM trust fund are not limited to negligent record keeping
and faulty accounting practices. Numerous sanctions have been filed against DOI and
Treasury officials, culminating in the most recent order holding Secretary of Interior Gale
Norton in contempt of court for deceiving Judge Lamberth about the agency's failure to
reform the trust system. Rumbelow & Tucker, supra note 1 (providing in part that DOI
Secretary Gale Norton and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Neal McCaleb were held
in contempt of court for committing fraud on the court and failing to abide by the 1999
court order to begin reformation of the trust system); John McCaslin, Continuous
Contempt, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A9 (providing that in 1999, Judge Lamberth
found Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and DOI Secretary Bruce Babbitt in contempt of
court for repeatedly violating court orders demanding a stop of the destruction of
potentially trust-related documents). Forty current and former government lawyers,
information officers, and deputy and assistant secretaries face possible sanctions in
conjunction with the Cobell lawsuit. Deirdre Davidson, Indian Trust Suit Takes Toll at
Interior: Employees Fleeing Case, Buying Personal Liability Insurance, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2002, at 1. Davidson also discussed the unusually personal nature of the suit and
the fact that plaintiffs are "not just attack[ing] the government and its policies, but [are
going] after individual employees." Id.
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effectively and efficiently the trust management responsibilities to
American Indian beneficiaries." 96 Homan added that the managers and
staff employed at the DOI and BIA lack sufficient knowledge and

practical experience "necessary to manage the federal government's trust
management activities according to the exacting fiduciary standards
required in today's modern trust environment."' 97 Additionally Homan
stated that the organizational structure of the BIA resulted in an
"intricate and complex coordination process" that proved ineffective in
dealing with decision-making and management issues pertaining to the
IIM accounts. 98
In analyzing the current state of the IIM trust fund, it is necessary to
take into account a number of underlying issues that have prevented any
type of substantive and positive reform. 99 Two main concerns need
addressing; the first pertains to rendering an accurate historical
accounting, and the second deals primarily with creating some sort of
written plan addressing the manner in which the 1994 Reform Act should
be implemented.'0
The most pervasive problem associated with

96. The Role of the Special Trustee Within the Department of the Interior: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Paul M.
Homan, Former Special Trustee for American Indians) [hereinafter Hearing];see also Bill
Miller, Indian Trust Reform Still Mired, Watchdog Says; Receivership Urged for Interior
Program, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A29 (discussing DOI Secretary Norton's
continuing reliance on the same longtime managers who have for years failed to make any
type of substantive reform to the trust system).
97. See Hearing, supra note 96. The aforementioned managerial incompetence
coupled with the inherent flaws associated with the BIA's organizational structure are the
primary reasons why:
[T]he BIA has never originated meaningful reforms of the trust management
processes in the last 30 years.
[Tihe BIA has resisted and ultimately failed to implement nearly all of the
meaningful reform efforts attempted in the last 30 years.
[A] new organizational structure, new management and massive retraining are
necessary for the future management of the Federal Government's trust
responsibilities to American Indians and the management of the implementation
of reforms identified in the Reform Act of 1994.
Id.
98. Id.
99. In addition to the managerial and accounting issues, are the Court's findings that
the Department of the Interior engaged in litigation misconduct, concealment, and fraud.
Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 161 (D.D.C. 2002). These charges focus on the
Interior's failure to initiate a historical accounting, failure to disclose the status of the
TAAMS subproject, the filing of false and misleading status reports pertaining to TAAMS
and the BIA Data Cleanup, and the making of false and misleading representations
regarding the computer security of IIM trust information. Id. at 1-2; supra note 97.
100. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-43 (D.D.C. 1999).
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reformation of the IIM trust accounts remains the Interior's inability to
render an accurate accounting."'
In rendering an accurate accounting, "the single biggest obstacle that
Interior ... face[s]" is missing data.0 2 In passing the Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act of 1994, Congress was well aware of the
problems associated with past document management policies practiced
by the DOI and Treasury."" The district court cited "inadequate
document management" as "one of the top criticisms of Interior's
handling of the IIM trust in terms of its eventual ability to render an
accounting."' 4
101. Id. at 97.
102. Id.; see also Robert Gehrke, Judge Blocks Plan to Move 32,000 Boxes of Indian
Trust Records, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 18, 2002 (discussing the problems associated with the
DOI's handling of trust-related documents and Judge Lamberth's order blocking Special
Trustee, Alan Balaran, from shipping 32,000 boxes of documents to Albuquerque, and
further stating that approximately 1,300 boxes out of 8,000 that were supposedly stored at
the Albuquerque location could not be located). See also Neely Tucker, Norton Admits
Some Indian Trust Records 'No Longer Exist': Interior Chief Defends Reform Efforts,
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A31; James Warren, U.S. Agency Admits Errors in Indian
Case; Records Destroyed on Cash Payouts, CHI. TRIB, Aug. 15, 2001, at 10; Robert
Gehrke, Government Criticizedfor Erasing E-mail Records in Indian Trust Fund Records,
ASSOC. PRESS, July 30, 2001.
103. Misplaced Trust, supra note 53. As opposed to merely allowing the Department
of the Interior and the Department of Treasury to issue informal orders pertaining to their
inability to render accurate accounting of the IIM trust accounts, Congress specifically
demanded that a full and accurate account of all funds be made. Id. Congressman Synar,
primary author of Misplaced Trust, was quoted as saying:
[Sipeaking on behalf of myself and [Congressman] Yates and four Congresses, it
is our clear intention-and let the Record show-it is our clear intention that
these [Indian trust] accounts will be reconciled and audited before there is any
movement or transfer [of the funds]. If you interpret that any other way, or if
your lawyers or personnel do, you're interpreting it wrong.
Id.
104. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 1999); See 60 Minutes: Broken
Promises, supra note 88 (highlighting some of the specific problems associated with the
DOI's record keeping). Some of the problems discussed include:
Beneficiaries receiving checks with minimal or no documentation, which in turn
makes it extremely difficult for beneficiaries to determine if they are receiving a
fair share of the proceeds generated from the oil income.
Lack of information/documentation pertaining to individual trust beneficiary
property or the resources derived from that property.
Approximately 50,000 accounts that do not have proper names or addresses.
Id. As with the DOI, Treasury also faces a number of trust management responsibilities.
Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (2001). The policies and practices of the Treasury
that have come under fire pertain to the Department's document destruction policies, loss
of investment funds due to the time lapse between deposit of those funds with the
Treasury and investment of those funds by the DOI, and loss of interest on IIM checks
between the time the check is issued and the time it is presented for payment. Id. at 1092.
Policies include the destruction of documents over six years and seven months old, with
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In developing a system of document management, the court directed
the Interior department to develop a written plan and procedure
pertaining to document retrieval.0 5 The primary purpose was to develop
a plan that would deal with the management of all IIM-related trust
documents that would be relevant to the rendering of an accurate
accounting.' 6
The problem associated with the creation and
implementation of a plan covering the management of documents is that
an unknown number of trust documents have been destroyed1°7 or are
otherwise inaccessible. 08
Special Trustee Homan testified that "[t]he records are the base for
the entire trust operation."' 9 As such, Congress demanded that the
Interior "create and finalize a plan for the proper retention of all IIMrelated trust documents necessary to render an accurate accounting."''10
This is more easily said than done."' It is impossible to perform an
minimal effort taken to preserve those documents that may be needed to conduct an
accurate accounting of the trust funds. Id.
105. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 34 (D.D.C. 1999). Treasury, like the DOI, has
proposed the development of similar systems and procedures to facilitate in the Treasury's
fulfillment of its fiduciary responsibilities. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1092 (2001).
106. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
107. Peter Maas, The Broken Promise, PARADE, Sept. 9, 2001, at 4. The full scope of
the document destruction first came to light following the initiation of the class-action suit
headed by Eloise Cobell. Id. at 6. A special investigator appointed by Judge Lamberth
discovered that the Department of the Interior had been destroying documents pertaining
to the IIM trust fund. Id. Furthermore, the special investigator determined that the
"Treasury officials had shredded 162 cartons of ledgers listing transactions and
disbursements plus records of uncashed checks-some 100 years old-that never reached
their intended Indian recipients." Id.; see infra at note 112.
108. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 47-48. Gibeaut cited an instance when government
officials moved hundreds of boxes containing trust-related documents to a warehouse in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Upon examination of the warehouse, it was determined that
review of these documents would not be permitted because the building was
"contaminated with deadly rodent-borne hantavirus." Id. Keith Harper cited another
instance in which documents were determined to be inaccessible, because the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration found that the boxes containing the trust
documents were stacked too high and therefore created an unsafe work environment.
Harper, supra note 77.
109. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing the trial transcript at 3164).
110. Id. at 43.
111. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 47-48. Documents relevant to this litigation date back to
the establishment of the trust system and the General Allotment Act of 1887. Id. at 47.
These trust-related documents were stored at Treasury facilities, DOI offices, and over
ninety different Indian agencies across the country. Id. The crux of the problem with the
production of these documents in the Cobell lawsuit centers around the scope of the
production order issued by Judge Lamberth. Id. The order required that the government
produce documents pertinent to the five named plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest. Id. Each of the aforementioned plaintiffs is identified as either a current or past
beneficiary of the IIM trust. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 14. By expanding the scope of
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accurate accounting when the agency charged with that responsibility has
destroyed or lost the necessary trust documents required to render such

an accounting."' Therefore, the December 21, 1999 order charged the
Interior with the responsibility of creating a plan that "clearly stat[es]
which documents it will keep and which it will destroy."' 13 Without such
documentation, beneficiaries "will never be able to estimate how much
of their own money is in the IIM trust. '" 4 The requirement that the
Interior provide for the proper planning of "architecture and staffing""'
is synonymous with the demand on the Interior to render an accurate
accounting. This requirement is based on the historical problems
associated with the IIM mismanagement, the inconsistent past practices
of the Interior, the "dramatic reforms planned for trust management,"
and Congress'
demand on the Interior to render an accurate
6
accounting."

production to include their predecessors in interest, thousands of files would need to be
located and analyzed at a cost of approximately $80 million in order to render an accurate
accounting. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 47-48. In 1998, DOJ officials sharply criticized the
DOI lawyer, Willa B. Permulmutter, for negotiating the production order. Id. at 48. DOJ
officials argued, to no avail, before Judge Lamberth that she "obviously didn't understand
what she had.., agreed to." Id.
112. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 43. Interior Department officials have admitted that
their ability to render an accurate accounting has been complicated by the fact that some
of the records needed to perform this task are missing or have been destroyed. More
Indian Trust Documents Missing, DENVER POST, Jan. 17, 2001, at A4 (citing the
destruction of what appeared to be approximately 160 boxes of trust-related documents at
the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Northern Cheyenne office). The problem associated with
the destruction of trust-related documents is not limited to historical records. In July 2001,
Judge Lamberth was notified that the DOI had been destroying e-mails and other
electronic materials that may have been pertinent to the mismanaged IIM accounts.
Robert Gehrke, Government Criticized for Erasing E-mail Records in Indian Trust Fund
Case, ASSOC. PRESS, July 30, 2001.
113. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 44.
116. Id. at 44-45.
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The two key components of the aforementioned requirement" pertain
specifically to the "computer systems architecture" and the "businesssystems architecture;" both are necessary to carry out the fiduciary
responsibilities set forth in the Reform Act of 1994. " " The purpose in
developing these two systems is to provide for the consistent and fluid
functioning of the trust management and to ensure that the federal
government will eventually live up to its fiduciary responsibilities." 9
Pursuant to the Reform Act of 1994, the court required the Secretary of
the Interior to properly discharge the trust responsibilities of the United
States through adequate staffing, supervision, and training of the trust's

management and accounting personnel.2
A. Non-Compliance With Reform

The Interior Department's IIM trust fund reform plan has made little
A
progress since Judge Lamberth's December 21, 1999 Order.12
statement made in a memorandum by Dominic Nessi, then-Chief
Information Officer for the BIA, highlighted the so-called "progress" of
the reform efforts following the 1999 ruling. 2 In the memo, Nessi stated

117. Bill Miller & Ellen Nakashima, Interior Dept. Misled Court On Reforms, Report
Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001, at A2. The "centerpiece" of the reform process is the
Trust Asset and Accounting Management System ("TAAMS"). Id. The system was
designed to "automatically keep track of titles, trust accounts and income generated from
roughly 170,000 tracts of land." Id. Specifically, TAAMS was intended to keep track of
the roughly $500 million generated each year from royalties from the sales of timber, oil
and gas, and other natural resources which are supposed to be channeled into the IIM
accounts. Id. Joseph Kieffer, the court appointed monitor assigned to assess the progress
of the trust fund reform recently stated that the General Accounting Office recommended
to DOI that they "scrap[] the system entirely, after 'tens of millions of dollars' [had
already been] invested." Id. Kieffer has further stated that the. "quality of the [TAAMS]
automated system depends on the accuracy of the records that go into it." Bill Miller,
Indian Trust Reform Still Mired, Watchdog Says Receivership Urged for InteriorProgram,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A29. Kieffer also stated that as of September 2001, only a
fraction of the work had been completed and that on average, "one land tract a day is
logged into the computer." Unfortunately, even that information is questionable. Id.
118. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
119. See id. at 44-45.
120. See id. at 45.
121. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F. 3d 1081,1089 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
122. Defendants' Motion for a Second Extension of Time to File Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion to reopen Trial One and Memorandum in Support Thereof at Attach. 2,
Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). Attachment Two is a letter regarding
the trust reform from then-Chief Information Officer ("CIO"), Dom Nessi to Tom
Slonaker, Special Trustee. As CIO, Nessi was in charge of the implementation of the
highly touted TAAMS, which was designed to allow the BIA "to administer trust assets,
generate timely bills, identify delinquent payments, track income from trust assets, and
distribute proceeds to the appropriate account holders." Cobell, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49

2004]

Indian Trust Fund

23
"that trust reform is slowly, but surely imploding at this point in time."'
Shortly thereafter, on April 16, 2001, the court appointed a court monitor

to "monitor and review all of the Interior['s] . . . trust reform activities

and file written reports of his findings with the [c]ourt.' ' 124 The first
report of the court monitor, filed on July 11, 2001, described the
Department of the Interior's efforts with respect to the rendering 1of
25 a
historical accounting as, "for a lack of a better term, at ground zero.'
The Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding the
Security of Trust Data at the Department of the Interior further supports
the conclusion that the Department of Interior has been unsuccessful in
its reform efforts.

The Special Master's findings revealed that the

(D.D.C. 2002); Ellen Nakashima, Effort to Fix Indian Trust Funds 'Imploding,' Memo
Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,2001, at A7.

123. Defendants' Motion for a Second Extension of Time to File Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion to reopen Trial One and Memorandum in Support Thereof at Attach. 2,
Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 1:96 CV 01285). Nessi's memo
also discusses the TAAMS project's lack of direction by quoting Yogi Berra; "If you don't
know where you are going, you end up somewhere else." Id. Nakashima, supra note 122
(re-affirming that "[t]he federal government's effort to fix billions of dollars in Indian
Trust funds is 'slowly, but surely imploding,' according to a memo written by [Dom
Nessi]").
124. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Tom Sloanker, Special
Trustee for American Indians, testified that the TAAMS system would be operational by
May 2003, but would not be able to provide "accurate historical land and asset records"
until 2005. Ellen Nakashima, Panel Criticizes Indian Trust Plan: House Members Worry
U.S. Won't Fully Account for Assets, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2001, at A27. After hearing
this testimony, Norman Dicks, Representative and member of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on the Interior, stated that "[t]here is no reason for Congress to be very
confident in" the development and implementation of TAAMS. Id. On the opposite end
of the spectrum, DOI officials commented that they have "created the first-ever office of
historical trust accounting," and [they] "remain committed to improving trust reform for
the good of the country." Miller & Nakashima, supra note 117.
125. First Report of The Court Monitor at 2, Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, (D.D.C.
2002) (No. 96-1285 (RCL)). See also John J. Fialka, Babbitt Misled Judge About New
System for Indian Funds in '99, Report Alleges, WALL ST.J., Aug. 10, 2001, at A10. Judge
Lamberth appointed special investigator Kieffer to "examine the Interior Department
reform efforts." Id. Kieffer reported that the information that was being reported to
Judge Lamberth in regard to the progress of the TAAMS project was "at best misleading
and at worst false." Id.
126. Report and Recommendation of the Special Master Regarding the Security of
Trust Data at the Department of the Interior at 11, Dec. 4, 2001, Cobell v. Norton, 240
F.3d 1081 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 1:96 CV 01285) Under Seal. Submitted on November 14,
2001, the Report discussed the importance of maintaining a secure system because of the
sensitive nature of the IIM trust information. See also First Investigative Report of the
Special Master Regarding Defendants' Response to Document Request 9 of Attachment
B to the Subpoena Duces Tecum at 12, Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.D.C. 2002)
(No. 1:96 CV 01285) (stating that the DOI cannot prove it made records management
reform because "Interior has no documents that support its claims that the tasks are
completed").
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Department of the Interior had "demonstrated a pattern of neglect that
has threatened, and continues to threaten, the integrity of trust data upon
'
which Indian beneficiaries depend."127
Subsequently, the court

concluded that the "Department failed to take any substantive action for
eighteen months after this Court issued its Phase I trial ruling., 128 As a
result, the court ordered the Department of the Interior to file a plan
detailing how it would bring itself "into compliance with the fiduciary
obligations that [it owes] to the IIM beneficiaries."' 29 Furthermore, the
court allowed the plaintiffs and the Department of Treasury to file plans
of their own pertaining to the aforementioned issues. 130
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A number of proposals have been put forth that attempt to fix the
longstanding problems associated with the IIM trust fund accounts. The
following proposals focus on managerial and administrative techniques
or methods that would purportedly remedy the longstanding problems
associated with the current trust management system. Not all of these
remedies touch upon the same specific issues, but they all have the
primary goal of creating a different type of managerial body that would
3
handle the trust issues currently in the hands of the BIA and the DO1.
In April 2002, Senators John McCain, Tom Daschle, and Tim Johnson
introduced the Indian Trust Asset and Trust Fund Management Reform
Act of 2002.132 This discussion bill proposed two changes to the Indian
127. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. Id. at 19-20.
129. Id. at 162 (ordering the plan to have a January 6, 2003 deadline).
130. Id. at 152 (stating that in cases concerning longstanding violations, plaintiffs
should be able to file their own proposals because of the "unconscionable delay by the
defendants in performing a historical accounting and discharging their fiduciary duties
properly").
131. Id. at 161-63.
132. Indian Trust Asset and Trust Fund Management and Reform Act of 2002, S.2212,
107th Cong. (2002). The discussion bill, introduced by Senators McCain, Daschle, and
Johnson, focused on a number of the same key concerns addressed in the Misplaced Trust
report. Id; Misplaced Trust, supra note 53, at 63-64 (discussing the Congressional
Oversight Committee's instruction to consider "alternatives that would allow . . .
individual Indians greater control and flexibility in the management of their trust funds,
without eliminating the trust responsibility"). Several of the aforementioned alternatives
include:
Authorizing tribes to manage their own funds within the trust status with
management plans and actual management subject to trustee approval and
monitoring; authorizing tribes to direct the trustee on how to manage tribal
funds, such as investing tribal trust funds in local banks to allow the tribes to
realize greater economic leverage from their funds; and authorizing tribes and
other representatives of IIM accountholders to manage IIM accounts subject to
appropriate controls and trustee supervision and monitoring.
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First, it proposed the
Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994.'
Reform.'3 4
creation of a Deputy Secretary for Trust Management and
The Deputy Secretary would oversee all trust fund asset administration
and management, including "consultations with Indian tribes and
individual [Indian] trust asset and trust fund account holders."'35 The
Deputy would head a newly created Office of Trust Reform
Implementation and Oversight, which would supervise the day to day
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary, the Special Trustee, the
Director of Minerals Management Service, and the Director of the
Management with regard to the administration of Indian
Bureau of Land
36

trust assets.'

The second key component of this bill is a set of provisions whereby
the Indian tribes and beneficiaries can directly manage or co-manage,
along with the Interior Secretary, trust funds assets, based on successful
tribal self-determination policies.'31 This provision would allow Indian

Id. at 64.
133. S.2212, 107th Cong. (2002).
134. Id. § 2. The President, with Senate approval, would appont the Deputy for a
period of six years; the Deputy would report directly to the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Section 2 provides that this newly created entity would function under Title II
of the Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994. Id. The Office of Trust
Reform would be responsible for the following duties:
1. Authorization to require the development and maintenance of an accurate inventory of
all trust properties, funds, and other assets;
2. Ensure the prompt posting of revenues derived from trust funds, properties, and assets;
3. Ensure that trust fund account holders receive monthly statements;
4. Ensure that trust fund accounts are audited at least once a year or more frequently if
necessary;
5. Ensure that the Secretary receives current and accurate information relating to the
administration and management of the trust funds, properties, and assets; provide for
regular consultation with trust fund account holders to ensure the greatest return on trust
assets and properties for the trust account holders; and
6. Enter into contracts and compacts under the Indian Self Determination Act for the
management of trust assets and funds by Indian tribes. Id. Section 2 also provides that
the Advisory Board (which currently functions on behalf of the Special Trustee), would
function on behalf of the Deputy Secretary. Id. The Advisory Board would be comprised
of tribal and individual accountholders, and members experienced in trust fund and
financial management, fiduciary investment management, and management of large
organizations. Id.
137. Id. § 3. Indian participation in trust fund activities would remove sections 202 and
203 of the 1994 Reform Act and replace them with a new section 202 that would provide
for the development and implementation of the Indian Trust Fund and Asset
Management and Monitoring Plan. Under this section each plan would be required to:
A. [D]etermine the amount and source of funds held in trust;
B. [I]dentify and prepare an inventory of all trust assets;
C. [l]dentify specific tribal goals and objectives;

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:543

tribes to use a greater degree of discretion in "designing and carrying
out" the planning and management processes related to the trust funds. 38
The Secretary would consult with tribes that choose not to participate in
order to develop an appropriate plan.' Under this proposition, the DOI
must consult and maintain involvement with tribes pursuant to a course
of action jointly chosen by the tribes and the DOI.'4
AnotherTrus
potential
put forth
by141
the Tribal Leaders and DOI
Refrm
Tsk proposal,
orce(Tas
r
Trust Reform Task Force (Task Force),
would consolidate all trust
2
14
responsibilities in one place within the Department of the Interior.
The main objective of the Task Force is to develop a number of
organizational structures that would facilitate the DOI's successful
performance of its trust responsibilities.14
The purpose of the Task
Force is to "develop and evaluate organizational options to improve the
integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the... Indian Trust Operations
consistent with Indian treaty rights, Indian trust law, and the
government-to-government relationship. ,144
The Task Force put forth three potential options for restructuring and
reorganization of the Indian trust fund.14 The three options are: 4 1 create
a new position (Deputy Secretary for Indian Affairs) that would be
responsible for all Indian related functions within the Department of the

D. [E]stablish management objectives for the funds and assets held in trust;
E. [Diefine critical values of the Indian tribe and provide identified management

objectives;
F. [Ildentify actions to be taken to reach established objectives;

G. [Ulse existing surveys, documents, reports and other research from federal
agencies, tribal community colleges, and land grant universities; and,

H. [B]e completed within three years [after the start of activity] to establish the
plan.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Tribal Leader/Departmentof the Interior Task Force on Trust Reform Report For
the Secretary of the Interior [hereinafter Tribal Leader/DO! Report], available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/finaltfreport.html (June 4, 2002). The Task Force is composed of
numerous DOI officials and tribal leaders that "represent a broad cross-section of tribal

interests." Id. § 3.
142. Norton Accepts Proposalon Indian Trust Reorganization: Tribes to Study Task
Force'sPlans, WASH. POST,June 5, 2002, at A21. The primary concern of the Task Force
is the development of alternatives to the Bureau of Indian Trust Asset Management
(BITAM) that was initially proposed by the DOI in November 2001. Tribal Leader/DO!
Report, supranote 141, § 1.
143. Tribal Leader/DO! Report, supra note 141, § 1.
144. Id. § 2.
145. Norton Accepts Proposal,supra note 142.
146. Id.
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Interior; 47 divide the BIA into several different organizations to handle
varying trust fund related needs;148 or49create a new position that would
combine the aforementioned options.

Opposing the plan put forth by the tribal task force, the plaintiffs in
Cobell argued for placement of the IIM trust in the care of a receiver
appointed and supervised by a federal court.5
The receiver would
operate under, and report to, the judicial branch. 5'
This
recommendation requires a high degree of judicial oversight and activism
and would place the responsibilities of the court-appointed receiver at
the level of trustee-delegate."'
Utilizing an alternative structure outside the Department of the
Interior to reform BIA and the Indian Trust Management Programs
presents a third potential option.' 3 This proposal, advocated by former
Special Trustee for America Indians, Paul M. Homan, primarily focuses
on "establishing an independent government sponsored enterprise to
manage the U.S. Government's trust management responsibilities,"
147. Tribal Leader/DO! Report, supra note 141, § 7. The Task Force concluded that
this option would allow for more manageable control, "provide[] clear lines of authority
over all trust functions, improve[] coordination with other Departmental Bureaus, and
ensure[] consistent policy of American Indian and Alaska Native Affairs." Id. Several of
this proposal's disadvantages include difficulty in obtaining sufficient support, recruitment,
and confirmation of the proposed Deputy Secretary, and inconsistency with the Indian
Reorganization Act. Id.; see supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. This proposal
may have been rooted in a previous attempt by Secretary Norton to create a new Bureau
of Indian Trust Asset Management that would operate separately from the BIA. Ellen
Nakashima, Norton Plan for Indian Trusts Meets With Skepticism on Hill, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 2002, at A23
148. Tribal Leader/DO! Report, supra note 141, § 7. This proposal would regroup the
BIA into three separate functional units to handle education, trust funds and trust
resources, and trust services. Id. By implementing this proposal, the Task Force believes
that it would enable the BIA to "increase management attention to key trust
responsibilities," provide for a "[filexible organizational structure," "[i]mprove[] program
focus and accountability," and provide for better coordination between the BIA, Bureau
of Land Management, and Minerals Management Services. Id. One disadvantage cited by
the Task Force is a perception that Indian services may be fragmented. Id.
149. Id. This proposal would create an Undersecretary of Indian Affairs and would
group BIA functions into "logical units." Id. The Task Force cites numerous advantages
to this proposal including: better coordination of all Native American functions within the
DOI, the Under Secretary as a "single executive sponsor," and the fact that the "Under
Secretary position [would be] more likely to be approved (versus Deputy Secretary
position)." Id. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. The only disadvantage cited by
the Task Force with respect to this proposal is the difficulty in recruiting and confirming
an Under Secretary. Tribal Leader/DO! Report, supra note 141, § 7.
150. Indian Trust, supra note 79.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Hearing, supra note 96 (statement of Paul M. Homan, Former Special Trustee for
American Indians).
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including "trust resource management, trust funds management and land
title and records management .... ,,14
VI. PATHWAY TO REFORMATION

A. Settlement
The DOI's 2001 budget contained instructions from lawmakers stating
that the "problems with the accounts would be 'best worked out through
a negotiation and settlement process.""" This remains true today. Chris
Changery, spokesman for Senate Indian Affairs Committee Chairman
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, provided what appears to be a common
sentiment regarding a proposed settlement: the millions of dollars
currently being spent to defend
the DOI would be more efficiently used
1 56

in reforming the trust system.
In determining an appropriate settlement amount, Congress has urged
that the government utilize a statistical sampling. This would require an
outside firm to analyze approximately 350 accounts in order to determine
how much the government owes all Indian account holders.157 The
sampling approach has received strong opposition by the majority of IIM
account holders who prefer that the government research each individual
154. Id. at 6.
155. Matt Kelley, Congress Presses for Potential Multi-Billion-Dollar Settlement of
Indian Trust Fund Suit, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 26, 2000.
156. Id. (noting that the 2001 DOI budget set aside 27.6 million for the lawsuit and
more than $80 million on "related programs to clean up mismanagement of the
accounts"). Id. Kevin Gover, head of the Interior Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs,
stated that one reason that settlement negotiations have not been fruitful was due to
individuals within the DOI and Department of Justice that "don't really want to settle."
Id. Plaintiffs in the Cobell suit have alleged that the earlier settlement negotiations failed
due to the government's unwillingness to keep confidential the plaintiffs' expert
preliminary analysis of the amount owed to the IIM account holders. Ellen Nakashima,
Panel Criticizes Indian Trust Plan: House Members Worry U.S. Won't Fully Account for
Assets, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2001, at A27. Jim McTague, Indian Fund Settlement Seen
Biggest Since S&L Bailout, BARRON'S (Oct. 16, 2000) (noting Congress' recent
appropriation of $27 million to fund the lawsuit against the DOI, and the sentiment in
Congress that the "government has been wasting millions of dollars on the lawsuit and
that it ought to stop now." Id. McTague's article also compared the current state of the
Indian trust fund to the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s in which the federal
government paid $160 billion to bailout the industry. Id. Matt Kelley, Gov't Mismanaged
Indian Accounts, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 24, 2001) (noting that settlement negotiations fell
through in the fall of 2000 due to the Justice Department's unwillingness to utilize the
sampling proposal).
157. Kelley, Gov't Mismanaged,supra note 156. The sampling approach was approved
by then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt as a cost-effective means of determining
how much the government owes the IIM account holders. Id. The project was reported to
cost approximately $70 million and would rely on data outside the sample accounts (oil
well production records) in order to determine an accurate figure for settlement. Id.
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account in order to reach an appropriate figure for settlement. 5 " Little
progress has been made, to date, with respect to reaching a settlement
agreement. Therefore, settlement negotiations, as opposed to litigation
tactics, need to be made a priority by DOI and DOJ officials. The
sooner a settlement is reached, the sooner full attention can be focused
on reforming the trust system.
B. Receivership

Plaintiffs in the Cobell litigation urged the court to appoint a receiver
over the IIM trust accounts to provide some type of equitable relief and
quantifiable trust reform."' In determining the viability of appointing a
receiver, it is necessary to consider the degree to which the existing
entities have been successful in their reform efforts. Judge Lamberth's
most recent contempt opinion provides that the "appointment of a
receiver should be the remedy of last resort," and that less drastic
remedies should be pursued if they exist.1 6 If it is determined that
further injunctions or contempt proceedings will not lead to compliance,
the court may be justified in resorting to receivership.1 6 ' Given DOI and
Treasury's utter failure to comply with their fiduciary responsibilities, it
seems apparent that appointment of a receiver is justified, and if nothing
more, would at least prevent the DOI from spending additional taxpayer

158. Id. Congress is not likely to endorse this approach, as it would require the BIA to
double its two billion dollar budget for an unknown period of time. Id. Joseph S. Kieffer
III, the court monitor appointed by Judge Lamberth commented that the statistical
sampling approach proposed by Babbitt was "a sham to make it appears that work was
proceeding." Bill Miller, Interior Faulted on Indian Trusts: Monitor: Government Staling
Reform of Mismanaged System, WASH. POST, July 12, 2001, at A25. Furthermore, Kieffer
alleged that the sampling proposal had already been approved by Babbitt and other highranking Interior officials when the DOI conducted a number of meetings with Native
Americans across the country in order to determine what type of accounting proposal they
felt would work best. Id.
159. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 134 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Bill Miller, Indian
Trust Reform Still Mired, Watchdog Says; Receivership Urgedfor Interior Program, WASH.
POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A29 (highlighting a September 2001 report by the Cobell court
monitor indicating that DOI managers "'failed to provide a truthful, accurate and
complete picture' of the status of reforms"). According to Cobell's Attorneys, this report
helps lay the "groundwork ... for why a receiver is necessary." Id.
160. Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 146 (D.D.C. 2002). Judge Lamberth cited Newman v.
State of Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (D.C. Ala. 1979), which provides that when considering
the use of a receiver, the court should evaluate whether or not further injunctions or
contempt proceedings will accomplish the task of compliance. Id.
161. See also John J. Fialka, Judge Holds Interior Secretary In Contempt Over Indian
Trust, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002, at A6.
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as "the gold
dollars 62 on a reformation process that has been described
1 63
standard for mismanagement by the federal government.
C. Alternate Reform Structures Managed and Implemented Outside the
DOI
In light of the utter failure on behalf of the Department of the Interior
to bring about any type of substantive change, it has become more and
more difficult to find a viable solution to the IIM trust problems within
the DOI and BIA. Special Trustee for American Indians, Paul Homan,
put forth a proposal that would eliminate the managerial incompetence,
mismanagement, and neglect that has characterized the DOI's handling
of the IIM accounts. Homan proposes that the DOI be eliminated from
Homan recommends that Congress establish "an
the picture.'6
independent government sponsored enterprise ' ' 65to manage the U.S.
1
Government's trust management responsibilities.
An independent, government-sponsored entity would be far better
suited to handle the complexities of the IIM trust fund for two reasons.
First, the government would be able to locate and hire professionals that
have the requisite knowledge and skill level that proper IIM
management demands.1 66 Professionals with strong backgrounds in
banking and the operation of financial institutions, familiar with the
"exacting fiduciary standards required in today's modern trust
environment," are far better suited to handling the problems currently
associated with the IIM accounts than unskilled DOI staffers.16 It is
perplexing that no other proposal accounts for what Homan finds the
162. It is reported that since the mid-1990s Congress has spent approximately $614
million dollars in an attempt to streamline the trust reform system. John J. Fialka, Babbitt
Misled Judge About New System For Indian Funds in '99, Report Alleges, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 10, 2001, at A10. Special monitor Joseph S. Kieffer III recently referred to the trust
system as potentially unsalvageable. See Bill Miller and Ellen Nakashima, Interior Dept.
Misled Court On Reforms, Report Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001, at A23. Keiffer's

comments were directly at the $40 million TAAMS system, the centerpiece of the trust
reform effort). Id.
163.
164.

Cobell, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002).
Hearing, supra note 96 (statement of Paul M. Homan, Former Special Trustee for

American Indians).
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id. at 7. Paul Homan discussed the fact that the DOI, "does not have the will or
ability to address the "mismanagement" issues and force out the incompetent managers at
BIA, nor is the Department likely to attract competent managers willing and able to

undertake a timely reform effort within the Department of the Interior." Id. at 8.
167. Id. at 4. Homan explains the primary cause of the trust mismanagement problems
as a "lack of competent managerial resources," and the fact that the BIA and DOI have
"virtually no effective knowledge or practical experience with the type of trust
management policies, procedures, systems and best practices" which are standard in the
"private sector trust departments and companies." Id.

2004]
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Second, the creation of an independent government-sponsored entity
would eliminate the intricate and complex coordination and difficult
decision-making that are "inherent in the BIA organizational culture. 169
An independent, government-sponsored entity can be structured in a
manner that minimizes decision-making and management problems and,
in turn, provides a more efficient and cost-effective method of IIM
management. 70 By removing IIM trust management to an entity outside
the DOI, the federal government could eliminate the underlying
decision-making and management issues that have plagued the DOI and
BIA in their efforts to bring about any type of substantive reform of the
trust system.
CONCLUSION

It is well established that the federal government is responsible for the
current state of the IIM trust fund accounts. For the past one hundred
years, the federal government failed to comply with its fiduciary
responsibilities, disputing the underlying facts and laying blame on
others. The time for an equitable solution has arrived.
Former Special Trustee for American Indians, Paul Homan, relayed
his sentiment succinctly:
The BIA'S mismanagement of the Indian trusts.., compares to
losses and accounting deficiencies at WorldCom, Global
Crossing, Enron and Arthur Anderson. Management has been
fired at each one of those bankrupt institutions and most of the
staff will lose their jobs. None will survive [its] bankruptcies
171
with a structure anything like [its] pre-bankruptcy structure.
By settling the dispute now, the federal government can focus its
attention on the reformation of the trust system, as opposed to fighting a
battle that it will not win.

168. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing the tribal task force
proposals and the McCain, Daschle, Johnson Discussion Bill's lack of emphasis on
managerial competence or staff skilled in complex trust management responsibilities).
169. Hearing, supra note 96, at 5 (Statement of Paul M. Homan, Former Special
Trustee for American Indians) (clarifying that transfer to an entity outside the DOI would
remove the bureaucratic mess that is associated with the management and decisionmaking process underlying the IIM accounts).
170. See id. This approach would allow for the independent entity to utilize the past
failures (and successes) of the DOI, Treasury, and BIA in implementing a new,
streamlined approach to management, as opposed to relying on the same ineffectual
reformation approaches that have been undertaken within the DOI. See id.
171. Id. at 9.
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ADDENDUM

Subsequent to the writing of this Comment the district court issued a
structural injunction setting forth a detailed timetable for DOI to follow
in order to comply with its fiduciary duties associated with the IIM
accounts. ' The injunction is currently on appeal
in the United States
173
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

172. Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2003) (Order Issuing Structural
Injunction); See also id. at 66 (Memorandum Opinion: "Fixing the System"); id. at 66
(Memorandum Opinion: "Historical Accounting").
173. Cobell v. Norton, 2004 WL 210700 (D.C. Cir. Jan 28, 2004) (NO. 03-5262, 035314) (Order).

